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Square Pegs and Round Holes: Shoehorning
Modern Family Dynamics into Antiquated Laws
A few years ago, a white woman and
a black woman visited a fertility clinic,
each woman to be inseminated with one
of her own eggs fertilized with her husband’s seed. The white woman became
pregnant. The black woman did not.
Nine months later, the white woman
gave birth to a black baby; she had
accidentally been inseminated with the
fertilized egg of the black couple.
The Solomonic legal issue was this:
whose child was this — the black couple
whose reproductive chemistry created
the embryo, or the white woman who
carried it to term and then delivered?
And if the child belonged to the biological parents, was the gestational mother
entitled to visitation?
Whenever the applicable law was
written, nobody envisioned a scenario
in which the biological and gestational
mother could be anything but one and
the same person. But the courts have
had to apply existing law to a circumstance the law never envisioned.
A unanimous First Department panel
in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano1 held for the
black couple in a thoughtful opinion by
Justice David Saxe. The court resolved
the dispute in this case, but wisely
declined to declare that no gestational

mother may ever assert visiwoman is the child’s ‘natural’
tation rights with the infant
mother?2
With the evolving definishe carried simply because
tion of family—not to menshe is a “genetic stranger” to
tion the brave new world of
the child. The court prudentgenetic science—judges are
ly conceded that we simply
increasingly forced to think
don’t know where science and
in ways they previously had
the law is taking us; hence it
not while applying laws in
would be unwise to venture
a way that was never conbeyond where we can see:
templated when they were
In referring to the rights
drafted, synchronizing old
and responsibilities of parents, the laws of this State, Hon. Gail Prudenti laws and old views with new
realities.
as well as the commentarA perfect example is the
ies and case law, often use
the term ‘natural parents,’ as distin- Third Department’s recent holding in
guished from adoptive parents, step- Matter of Christopher YY v. Jessica ZZ
parents, and foster parents. Until and Nichole ZZ,3 which held, apparently
recently, there was no question as to for the first time, that the presumption
who was a child’s ‘natural’ mother. It of legitimacy that attaches to a child
was the woman in whose uterus the born within marriage applies to a child
born to a same-sex marriage. That may
child was conceived and borne.
It was only with the recent advent seem obvious and self-evident; after all,
of in vitro fertilization technology Domestic Relations Law §24 (entitled,
that it became possible to divide “Effect of Marriage on Legitimacy of
between two women the functions Children”), simply and clearly states
that traditionally defined a mother, that “[a] child…born of parents who
at least prenatally. With this technol- prior to or subsequent to the birth of
ogy, a troublesome legal dilemma has such child shall have entered into a
arisen: [w]hen one woman’s fertilized civil or religious marriage…is the legitieggs are implanted in another, which mate child of both parents”. There is no

question that Jessica and Nichole were
legally married. But there is a glitch
that the drafters of §24 likely never
foresaw. The presumption of legitimacy
is rebuttable, traditionally upon proof
that the child is the offspring of someone
outside the marriage. In other words,
in that construct, legitimacy is solely a
biological question. The fact pattern in
Matter of Christopher undermines the
entire premise and forces the courts to
reconsider what “legitimacy” means in
this day and age and in the context of a
law designed to preserve the family unit
and assure the children of stability.
Here, Jessica and Nichole were married in August 2014. Subsequent to
their marriage, Jessica conceived a child
through sperm donated by Christopher.
Jessica and Nichole waived any right
to child support from Christopher;
Christopher expressly waived any
right to paternity, custody or visitation.
Several months after the child was born,
Christopher asserted his paternity and
sought custody of his biological child.
Family Court ordered paternity testing, and the Third Department
reversed, notwithstanding the fact that
See ANTIQUATED, Page 26
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out a compelling justification. The
difficulty is in fashioning the presumption so as to afford the same,
and no greater, protection.5

Continued From Page 3
nine months earlier a slightly different panel of the same court (three of
the five justices were on both cases)
had unanimously concluded that the
presumption of legitimacy is rebuttable
upon “clear and convincing evidence…
tending to prove that the child was not
the product of the marriage” (emphasis
added).4 In Matter of Christopher, it is
obvious that the child is not the “product” of a same-sex marriage, at least not
in the customary sense, but the Third
Department, in a far-sighted opinion by
Justice Robert Mulvey, recognized that
the application of statutory and case law
addressing different-gender spouses is
“inherently problematic” when dealing
with same-gender couples:
This changing legal and social
landscape requires reexamination
of the traditional analysis governing the presumption of legitimacy…
While a workable rubric has not yet
been developed to afford children
the same protection regardless of
the gender composition of their parents’ marriage, and the Legislature
has not addressed this dilemma, we
believe that it must be true that a
child born to a same-gender married
couple is presumed to be their child
and, further, that the presumption of
parentage is not defeated solely with
proof of the biological fact that, at
present, a child cannot be the product
of same-gender parents. If we were to
conclude otherwise, children born to
same-gender couples would be denied
the benefit of this presumption with-

To again quote Justice Mulvey,
“[t]he Legislature has not addressed this
dilemma.” (emphasis added).
Courts, of course, do not have the
luxury of waiting for the Legislature
to get around to addressing dilemmas,
especially those that were not foreseeable until a legal dispute brought the
issue to the fore. With the seismic shift
in the perception of “family” over the
past generation, judges are more and
more called upon to force the square peg
of modern culture into the round hole of
the law, and sometimes even our most
esteemed high courts, down the road, hit
the reset button.
That is what happened with the
Court of Appeals’ landmark 2016 opinion in Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.6
In that case, the court backtracked from
a 25-year-old precedent in Alison D. v.
Virginia M.7 and found, lo and behold,
that Domestic Relations Law §70 permits “a non-biological, non-adoptive parent to achieve standing to petition for
custody and visitation”8 after all. Alison
D. said just the opposite, concluding that
a child’s lesbian co-parent was a “legal
stranger” with no right to seek visitation
rights after separating from the biological mother. Only then-Associate Judge
Judith S. Kaye saw the writing in the
wall back in 1991.
In her dissent, Judge Kaye observed
that DRL §70 specifies that the person
seeking custody or visitation must be the
“parent,” a term the Legislature found
no need to define, undoubtedly because
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at the time the meaning was self-evident
and unambiguous. The majority was
leery of expanding the definition beyond
its traditional intended meaning, understandably concerned that doing so could
open the floodgates and permit every
dedicated caregiver to sue for visitation,
while upsetting myriad legal principles.
Judge Kaye, however, believed there
was a happy medium, and said her colleagues “overlook and misportray the
Court’s role in defining otherwise undefined statutory terms to effect particular
statutory purposes, and to do so narrowly, for those purposes only.” 9
It is not my intention to spell
out a definition but only to point
out that it is surely within our
competence to do so. It is indeed
regrettable that we decline to exercise that authority in this visitation matter, given the explicit statutory objectives, the courts’ power,
and the fact that all consideration of
the child’s interest is, for the future,
otherwise absolutely foreclosed.10
In Brooke S.B., the court found “limited circumstances” where DRL §70
“permits a non-biological, non-adoptive
parent to achieve standing to petition
for custody and visitation.” Judge Sheila
Abdus-Salaam, writing for the court,
held:
The definition of ‘parent’ established by this Court 25 years ago
in Alison D. has become unworkable when applied to increasingly
varied familial relationships....Under
the current legal framework, which
emphasizes biology, it is impossible—
without marriage or adoption—for
both former partners of a same-sex
couple to have standing, as only one
can be biologically related to the child.
By contrast, where both partners in a
heterosexual couple are biologically
related to the child, both former partners will have standing regardless of
marriage or adoption. It is this context that informs the Court’s determination of a proper test for standing
that ensures equality for same-sex
parents and provides the opportunity
for their children to have the love and
support of two committed parents.”11
Without question, the definition of
“family” is constantly changing and
has shifted continuously since the very
founding of the republic.12 The new family paradigm is there is no paradigm. The
nuclear family “ideal” glorified in such
television programs as Ozzie and Harriet
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Supreme Court denied the certiorari
and deferred to the appellate process.
In the meantime, Congress is grappling with a legislative solution. As of
the writing of this article, the litigation
is pending and Dream Act legislation
has not been passed.
What is emerging is a trend from the
executive office to eliminate immigration
programs authorized by that branch.
Between TPS and DACA program terminations, over one million foreign
nationals who have had legal status in
the United States will be losing that status. It will be incumbent upon Congress
to legislate any immigration programs
for the duration of this administration.

and Leave it to Beaver — breadwinner
father, homemaker mother, “natural”
(translation: biological) parents — gave
way to family units with a single parent,
same sex parents who may or may not
share DNA with children they may or
may not have adopted and, other myriad relationships that could have little
(or everything) to do with genetics. Our
statutes have not kept pace with this
shift, and to this day the U.S. Census
Bureau defines “family” as “a group of
two people or more (one of whom is the
householder) related by birth, marriage,
or adoption and residing together.”13
And the problems that arise therefrom
must be resolved by the courts, whether
there is clear legislative guidance or
precedent or not.
Judge Kaye in Alison D. recognized
the court’s legitimate role in defining
terms undefined by the Legislature—
such as “parent”—to effect the overarching intent of the statute. That is a role
the courts must embrace, with all due
caution and restraint. Culture, science
and law are intersecting in unprecedented ways, and much of the time the resultant societal and legal questions arise in
the courts that need to be brought to the
attention of lawmakers.
Judge Gail Prudenti is Dean of the Maurice
A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra
University and Executive Director of the
Center for Children, Families and the Law.
She was previously Chief Administrative
Judge of the State of New York and
Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division,
Second Department.
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